



BANCO DE MEXICO

CyRCE :

A Credit Risk default model that measures concentration, single obligor limits and bank capital adequacy.

Javier Martínez Díez-Canedo.
March 2002

Index

I Introduction

II CyRC E m odel

III. System ic CreditR isk analysis

Introduction

- One of the main concerns of regulators is having a proper assessment of the solvency of the Financial System .
- It is important to have an adequate picture of the level of risk of the Financial System as a whole, where risk is concentrated, and the individual banks' contribution to overall risk.
- This represents a technically formidable problem for several reasons:
 - Information
 - Credit risk methodologies:
 - No accepted paradigm
 - Numerical techniques with heavy computational requirements
 - How to draw the picture?

Existing Credit Risk Methodologies

- Big information requirements.
- Substantial computational effort to obtain loss distribution.
- No explicit relation between credit risk and
 - Capital adequacy
 - Concentration
 - Single obligor limits

Index

I. Introduction

II. CyRCE model

III. Systemic Credit Risk analysis

CyRCE : Properties

CyRCE is a default Credit Risk Methodology which avoids the use of computationally demanding numerical methods, by assuming that the loan portfolio loss distribution can be characterized by its mean and its variance:

- Closed form expression for Value at Risk (VaR)
- Explicit parametrization of all relevant credit risk elements.

Credit risk related Capital Adequacy can be established in terms of:

- Default rates.
- A measure of concentration and/or
- Single obligor limits.

CyRC E : Capital Adequacy and Credit Risk

The model is “*built up*” from a very simple case where all bonds have *iid* default probabilities, and extended to a general situation where default probabilities of bonds can differ, be correlated and the portfolio can be segmented arbitrarily to detect risky concentration segments.

CyRCE : A simple Model

Let f_i be the i^{th} loan amount in the portfolio; $i = 1, 2, \dots, N$

Define "N" binary iid random variables:

$$X_i = \begin{cases} f_i & \text{with probability } p \\ 0 & \text{with probability } 1 - p \end{cases}$$

The mean and standard deviation of the total portfolio loss are:

$$\mu = pV$$

$$V = \sum_{i=1}^N f_i$$

$$\sigma = \sqrt{p(1-p) \sum_{i=1}^N f_i^2}$$

CyRCE : Value at Risk

Assume for the moment that the loss distribution can be approximated by the Normal distribution, so that, the value at risk with confidence level α is:

$$VaR_{\alpha} = \mu V + z_{\alpha} \sqrt{p(1-p) \sum_{i=1}^N f_i^2}$$

EXPECTED LOSS μ

UNEXPECTED LOSS $z_{\alpha}\sigma$


CyRC E : Capital Adequacy

CAPITALIZATION RATE :

$$\psi = \frac{\text{Economic Capital}}{\text{Value of Loan Portfolio}}$$

Capital adequacy requires:

$$\frac{\text{Economic Capital}}{\text{Capital}} \geq \text{VaR}_\alpha$$



$$\psi \geq p + z_\alpha \sqrt{p(1-p)H(\mathbf{F})}$$



where a measure of concentration emerges naturally:

$$H(\mathbf{F}) = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^N f_i^2}{\left(\sum_{i=1}^N f_i \right)^2}$$

Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index

$\mathbf{F} = [f_1 \ f_2 \ \dots \ f_N]^T$ loan portfolio vector


CyRCE : Concentration Limit

The VaR expression establishes a limit on concentration through $H(F)$:

$$H(F) = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^N f_i^2}{\left(\sum_{i=1}^N f_i \right)^2} \leq \frac{(\psi - p)^2}{z_\alpha^2 p(l-p)}$$

From which single obligor limits can be obtained.

CyRCE : Single Obligor Limits and Concentration



$\psi = \frac{K}{V}$ is the capitalization ratio.

$$f_i \leq \delta K = \delta \frac{K}{V} \times V = \delta \psi V = \theta V$$


$i=1, \dots, N$

So, "single obligor limits" can be set on Capital or on total portfolio value as long as:

$$\theta = \delta \psi = \delta (\text{Capitalization Ratio})$$

CyRCE : Single Obligor Limits and Concentration

HHIP property I:



$$f_i \leq \theta V$$
$$i = 1, \dots, N$$



$$H(\mathbf{F}) \leq \theta$$

Then, it follows that:

$$f_i \leq \theta V \quad i = 1, \dots, N$$

$$\theta \leq \frac{(\psi - p)^2}{z_\alpha^2 p (1-p)}$$




The condition is
sufficient

CyRCE :The concentration index

HH IP property 2: $H(F) \leq \theta \Rightarrow \theta \leq \text{Maximum ban} \leq \sqrt{\theta v}$

- The tradeoff for lending the maximum ban to a single debtor, is at the expense of credit to all other debtors, which tends to zero as N increases.



This graph shows how fast decreases the amount of other bans under the hypothesis of a maximum ban when N increases.

CyRCE : Simple Model continued

The expression

$$\psi \geq p + z_\alpha \sqrt{p(1-p)H(F)}$$

is attractive because:


Loan portfolio value
at risk through: " z_α "

Capital Adequacy:
" ψ "

Single Obligor Limits

Single loan default
probabilities: " p "

Loan portfolio
concentration: " $H(F)$ "



CyRC E : Exam ple

The average default probability for the 25 banks is 10.89% .

$$H(F) = \frac{4,728^2 + 7,728^2 + \dots + 6,480^2}{130,164^2} = 0.0661$$

Obligor	Amount	Obligor	Amount
A1	4,728	A14	5,042
A2	7,728	A15	15,411
A3	5,528	A16	1,933
A4	5,848	A17	2,317
A5	3,138	A18	2,411
A6	3,204	A19	2,598
A7	4,831	A20	358
A8	4,912	A21	1,090
A9	5,435	A22	2,652
A10	5,320	A23	4,929
A11	5,765	A24	6,467
A12	20,239	A25	6,480
A13	1,800	Total	130,164

Assum ing Normality and a 5% , confidence level, Capital adequacy requires:

$$\psi \geq 0.1089 + 1.96\sqrt{(0.1089)(1 - 0.1089)(0.0661)} = 26.6\%$$

Or:

$$K \geq (26.6\%)(130,164) = \$34,603$$

CyRC E : Exam ple (continued)

Suppose $K = 35,000$, then:

Capitalization ratio: $\psi = \frac{K}{V} = \frac{35,000}{130,164} = 26.9\% \geq 26.6\% \text{ required}$

¿ Is the portfolio too concentrated?

$$H(F) = 0.0661 \leq \frac{(\psi - p)^2}{z_{\alpha}^2 p(1-p)} = \frac{(0.2689 - 0.1089)^2}{(1.96)^2 (0.1089)(0.8911)} = 0.0687$$



¿ What's the largest possible loan?

$$f^* = (\sqrt{0.0687})(130,164) = \$34,108$$



¿ Would there be single obligor limit compliance?

$$f_i \leq 0.0687 \times 130,164 = \$8,942$$



CyRCE : A General Model

- All banks have different default probabilities: p_1, \dots, p_N .
The mean and standard deviation of the portfolio losses per bank are:

$$\mu_i = p_i f_i$$

$$\sigma_i = \sqrt{p_i(1-p_i)} f_i \quad i = 1, \dots, N$$

2. All portfolio losses can be correlated to each other through a covariance matrix.

$$\sigma_{i,j} = \frac{\text{Default Covariance between bank } i \text{ and bank } j}{\sigma_i \sigma_j} = \rho_{i,j}$$

$\rho_{i,j}$: default correlation between bank i and bank j

CyRCE : Value at Risk

Approximating by the Normal distribution, the value at risk with confidence level α is:

$$VaR_\alpha = \sum_i p_i f_i + z_\alpha \sqrt{\sum_i \sigma_i^2 + \sum_{i \neq j} \sigma_i \sigma_j \rho_{ij}}$$

↓ ↓ ↓

EXPECTED LOSS VARIANCE COVARIANCE

Using matrix notation:

$$VaR_\alpha = \pi^T F + z_\alpha \sqrt{F^T M F}$$

EXPECTED LOSS

UNEXPECTED LOSS

$$\pi^T = [p_1 \dots p_N]^T$$

M: covariance matrix

CyRC E : Capital Adequacy

Capital Adequacy relation is now :

$$\psi \geq \frac{\pi^T F}{V} + z_\alpha \sqrt{\frac{F^T M F}{F^T F}} H(F)$$

Weighted average default probability of the bank portfolio \bar{p}

$$R(F, M) = \frac{F^T M F}{F^T F}$$

Herfindahl-Hirschman index

HH

Rayleigh's quotient

Sums arises the variance-covariance effect for portfolio losses

CyRCE : Single obligor limits and Concentration

Under the general model, the concentration bound is:

$$\Psi \geq \bar{p} + z_\alpha \sqrt{R(\mathbf{F}, \mathbf{M}) H(\mathbf{F})}$$



$$H(\mathbf{F}) \leq \frac{(\Psi - \bar{p})^2}{z_\alpha^2 R(\mathbf{F}, \mathbf{M})}$$

$$\left[\text{Capitalization Ratio} - \text{Weighted average default probability of the loan portfolio} \right]^2$$

Confidence Level² × Variance-Covariance effect

CyRCE : Example

Rating	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Mean (%)	1.65	3.00	5.00	7.50	10.00	15.00	30.00
Stand. Dev.(%)	12.74	17.06	21.79	26.34	30.00	35.71	45.83

$$H(F) = 6.61\%$$

$$\bar{P} = 10.89\% \quad R(F, M) = 0.401$$

Obligor	Amount	Obligor	Amount
A1	4,728	A14	5,042
A2	7,728	A15	15,411
A3	5,528	A16	1,933
A4	5,848	A17	2,317
A5	3,138	A18	2,411
A6	3,204	A19	2,598
A7	4,831	A20	358
A8	4,912	A21	1,090
A9	5,435	A22	2,652
A10	5,320	A23	4,929
A11	5,765	A24	6,467
A12	20,239	A25	6,480
A13	1,800	Total	130,164

Assuming Normality and a 5% confidence level, Capital adequacy requires:

$$\psi \geq 0.1089 + 1.96 \sqrt{(0.401)(0.0661)} = 42.78\%$$

Or:

$$K \geq (42.78\%)(130,164) = \$55,685$$

CyRCE : Example (continued)

Suppose $K = 60,000$, then

Capitalization ratio: $\psi = \frac{K}{V} = \frac{60,000}{130,164} = 46.10\% \geq 42.78\% \text{ required}$

¿ Is the portfolio too concentrated?

$$H(F) = 0.0661 \leq \frac{(\psi - \bar{p})^2}{z_{\alpha}^2 R(F, M)} = \frac{(0.4610 - 0.1089)^2}{(1.96)^2 (0.401)} = 0.0805$$



¿ What's the single obligor limit?


$$f^* = (0.0805) (130,164) = \$10,482$$



CyRCE : Portfolio Segmentation

The loan portfolio can be partitioned arbitrarily in segments such that:

- Each group has its own default probabilities.
- The covariance matrix M includes two kinds of covariation:
 - Idiosyncratic: among defaults within the same segment.
 - Extra-group: among defaults of different segments.



CyRCE : Value at Risk

The value at risk with confidence level α for each segment j is:

$$VaR_{\alpha}^j = \pi_j^T F_j + z_{\alpha} \sqrt{F^T R_j F}$$



EXPECTED LOSS



UNEXPECTED LOSS

π_j is the vector of default probabilities of segment j

F_j is the vector of the amounts of the loans in segment j

R_j is the matrix of the idiosyncratic covariances in segment j and the default covariances between the loans of segment j with the loans of other segments.

CyRCE : Value at Risk (continued)

The matrix R_j has the following structure:

$$R_j = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & \cdots & C_{1,j} & \cdots & 0 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\ C_{j,1} & \cdots & M_j & \cdots & C_{j,N} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\ 0 & \cdots & C_{N,j} & \cdots & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

M_j = Matrix of the idiosyncratic covariances for the bans in segment j.

$C_{j,i}$ = Matrix of default covariances between the bans of segment j with the bans of segment i.

CyRC E : Capital Adequacy

After a bit of algebra, the Capital Adequacy relation per segment is:

$$\psi_j \geq \frac{\pi_j^T F_j}{V_j} + z_\alpha \sqrt{R(F_j, M_j) H(F_j) + 2 \sum_{j \neq i} \frac{F_j^T C_{ji} F_i}{V_j^2}}$$

Weighted average
default probability of
the banks in segment j
 p_j

Rayleighs quotient
for segment j

HFI

Adjustment for
Correlation

CyRCE : Single oblique limits and Concentration

The concentration bound per segment is:


$$H(F_j) \leq \frac{(\psi_j - \bar{p}_j)^2}{z_\alpha^2 R(F_j, M_j)} - 2 \sum_{j \neq i} \frac{F_j^T C_{ji} F_i}{V_j^2 R(F_j, M_j)}$$

Bound

Adjustment for
Correlation

Numerical comparison to CreditRisk+

For illustration purposes, an arbitrary sample of 1,320 loans was picked from SENICREB and VaR was calculated following both CreditRisk+ methodology and CyRCCE methodology, using a Normal and a Gamma distribution.



Index

I. Introduction

II. CyRC E m odel

- **System ic CreditR isk analysis**


III.I Position

III.II VaR analysis

Distribution of the ban portfolio by major banks: SYSTEM

SYSTEM = 364,150 MP

November 2001



S Y S T E M

E C O N O M I C S E C T O R


- AGR/LIVESTOCK
- INDUSTRY
- CONSTRUCTION
- COMMERCE
- COMMUNICATION & TRANSPORT
- SERVICES
- OTHERS
- RATED LOANS

- Agriculture
- Livestock, Forestry, Fishing & Hunting
- Extractive
- Food
- Textile
- Wood/Paper Products
- Chemical
- Non-Metallic Minerals & Plastics
- Mortgage/Consumption/Credit Cards
- Metals & Metallic Prod.
- Machinery & Equipment
- Other Industries
- Financial
- Professional/Technical/Personal
- Recreational/Hotels/Restaurants
- Social & Communal
- Group by five differentiates

Distribution of the bank portfolio by Economic Activity: SYSTEM

November 2001

Total Loan Portfolio: 364,150 MP



* Rated by Standard & Poor's, Moody's y Fitch

Index

I. Introduction


II. CyRC E m odel

- System ic Credit Risk analysis**


III.I Position

III.II VaR analysis


Default Probability, Concentration Index and Rayleigh's Quotient: SYSTEM



Weighted average default probability by Economic Activity



Risk, Default Probability, Concentration Index and Rayleigh's quotient: SYSTEM




Contribution to System Risk by Institution : November 2001




VaR 99/EC

◆ VaR 99 accumulate


— VaR 99/EC average: 30.6%




Default Probability, Concentration Index and Rayleigh's Quotient: November 2001



Contribution to System Risk by Economic Activity: November 2001



Capital adequacy : $(EC - VaR)/\text{Loan portfolio} \geq 0$



END