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The Cost of Genetic Information

• If insurers do have genetic information: – People at higher risk might pay more – Question: how much more? • If insurers do not have genetic information: – People at higher risk might over-insure (adverse selection) – Question: how much would that cost? • Quantitative questions = actuarial models

A Simple Life Insurance Model



A Simple Population Model



No Family History



Family History No Mutation



No Moratorium



No Family History



Family History No Mutation



Moratorium on All Test Results



No Family History



Family History No Mutation



Moratorium on Family History



No Family History



Family History No Mutation



Features of the Model

The "normal" level of insurance
The extent of genetic testing
The probability of a positive result
The behaviour of "adverse selectors"
The behaviour of insurers

Examples of Conclusions

- Multifactorial disorders unlikely to matter for life insurance
- Adverse selection may be a problem
 - if overinsurance is allowed
 - in small (e.g. new) markets
 - for critical illness or long-term care insurance
- Penetrance of many genes is overstated

Genetic Epidemiology

- Sequence of events:
 - Association of disease and gene loci
 - Discovery of gene(s)
 - Discovery of molecular pathway(s)
 - Epidemiology in high-risk families
 - Epidemiology in general population
- Timescale, 10 years or more?

The Way Ahead?

- Evidence-based underwriting
 - Demanded by regulators?
 - New standards for all use of medical data?
 - Precautionary principle in favour of applicants?
- The evidence base
 - Published, peer-reviewed research
 - Comparison with standards of `normal science'