


New thinking on performance evaluation

Robin Penfold


International Congress of Actuaries
Washington, DC | 30 March – 4 April 2014



Standard performance evaluation has a problem



- Why?
- How big is it?
- What can we do about it?

Why is there a problem?




We 'lose our heads' with underperformance


'Induce downshift'



How big is the problem?




Round-trip transitions by US plan sponsors



Source: Goyal and Wahal, The Journal of Finance, August 2008. (<331 decisions)

What can we do about the problem?




Why do we do this?



Rehearse a response before you experience the emotional stress

Ted, the precocious Bayesian updater



Illustration, via The Economist

Two types of managers

	Stars	Flops
Expected net excess return	1% pa	-1% pa
Tracking error	3% pa	3% pa

Deriving the expected alpha of Stars and Flops

- Sharpe's Arithmetic of Active Management


- $\pi_s \{E(\alpha_s) + c\} + (1 - \pi_s) \{E(\alpha_f) + c\} = 0$

- π_s – the proportion of Stars (eg 15%, partly from Barras et al)
- c – the cost of investing (eg 0.67% a year, from French)

- $E(\alpha_f) = - \left[\frac{c + \pi_s E(\alpha_s)}{1 - \pi_s} \right]$ (ie -1.0% a year)

You, the Bayesian updater

2014




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10



More specifics

- **In 2011, annual expected excess return is:**
 - (70% of Star, at +1%) plus (30% of Flop, at -1%)
 - In other words, 0.4%
- **Last 3 years: manager underperformed by -1% pa**
 - In-line with what was expected of a Flop
 - Below the 1% pa that was expected from a Star

Bayesian updating, from P_O (70%) to P_N




$$P_N = \frac{L_S P_O}{L_S P_O + L_F (1 - P_O)} = 55\%$$


Did Stephen initially pick a Star?

- **Probably ...**
 - 55% likelihood, not 70% likelihood
- **Lower expected outperformance**
 - (55% of +1%) plus (45% of -1%)
 - **0.1% pa** (not 0.4% pa)

Outcomes depend upon two factors



Need to reflect mean-reversion of excess returns



Source: Goyal and Wahal, The Journal of Finance, August 2008. (<331 decisions)


Example with mean reversion of excess returns

- **70% initial likelihood → 55% revised likelihood**
- **Expected excess return of a Flop this period:**
 - Still -1.0% pa, as it performed as expected last period
- **Expected excess return of a Star this period:**
 - Higher than before, given last period's disappointment
 - 1.0% pa → 1.3% pa
- **Expected excess return is 0.3% pa for next period**
 - Not 0.1% pa

Outcomes when excess returns mean-revert

	50%	70%	90%
-6%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%
-5%	-0.2%	-0.1%	0.3%
-4%	-0.3%	-0.1%	0.4%
-3%	-0.4%	-0.1%	0.6%
-2%	-0.4%	0.1%	0.8%
-1%	-0.2%	0.3%	0.9%
0%	0.0%	0.4%	0.9%
1%	0.1%	0.5%	0.8%
2%	0.2%	0.5%	0.7%
3%	0.3%	0.4%	0.5%
4%	0.2%	0.3%	0.3%
5%	0.1%	0.1%	0.2%
6%	-0.1%	0.0%	0.0%

Outcomes when excess returns mean-revert



Hang tight (add)

Sufficient level
of discomfort

Insufficient level
of discomfort

Take profits (trim)

How does this approach help us?

- **Investors can rehearse their response to underperformance before they feel stressed**
 - Less likely to fire managers for performance reasons?
 - May trim a manager's portfolio if it performs very well
- **Describes what matters in manager evaluation**
 - Investor's belief on the mean-reversion of the manager's excess returns
 - Investor's confidence in its consultant

But this is only a (two-factor) model

- **Usual caveats apply**

- Don't fail the Derman test:
 - Believe “that someone can write down a theory that encapsulates human behaviour and thereby free you of the obligation to think for yourself ”
- Use the model alongside other inputs
- Recognise that the model is far better at providing a guide to sensitivities than stating ‘the answer’

Limitations of reliance

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