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## An Academic Response to Basel 3.5 Risk Aggregation and Model Uncertainty

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## **Four regulatory documents**

- R1: BCBS-Consultative Document, May 2012, Fundamental review of the trading book ( $\Leftarrow$  Basel 3.5)
- R2: United States Senate, March 15, 2013, JPMorgan Chase Whale trades: a case history of derivatives risks and abuses
- R3: UK House of Lords/House of Commons, June 12, 2013, Changing banking for good, Volumes I and II
- R4: BCBS-Consultative Document, October 2013, Fundamental review of the trading book: A revised market risk framework. ( $\Leftarrow$  Basel 3.5)

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<span id="page-2-0"></span>• (In total, more than 1000 pages!)



#### **Some statements:**

From R1: Page 20. *Choice of risk metric*: "... However, a number of weaknesses have been identified with VaR, including its inability to capture "tail risk". The Committee therefore believes it is necessary to consider alternative risk metrics that may overcome these weaknesses."

From R2: Pages 13 and 172. *VaR models changes*: "\$7 billion, or more than 50% of the total \$13 billion RWA reduction, could be achieved by modifying risk related models." "The change in VaR methodology effectively masked the significant changes in the portfolio."



From R3: Volume II, page 119. *Output of a "stress test" excercise, from HBOS*:

> "We actually got an external advisor [to assess how frequently a particular event might happen] and they came out with one in 100,000 years and we said "no", and I think we submitted one in 10,000 years. But that was a year and a half before it happened. It doesn't mean to say it was wrong: it was just unfortunate that the 10,000th year was so near."



## Basel 3.5 Question

In this talk we focus on the following question raised by the Basel Committee:

```
From R1, Page 41, Question 8:
```
"What are the likely constraints with moving from VaR to ES, including any challenges in delivering robust backtesting, and how might these be best overcome?"

A challenge for financial mathematicians and financial statisticians!

From R4, Page 3:

<span id="page-5-0"></span>"the Committee has its intention to pursue two key confirmed reforms *. . .* Move from Value-at-Risk (VaR) to Expected Shortfall (ES)."**K ロ K (個) K (目) K (目) 시 로 보 (目) - 9 Q (V** 



We focus on the mathematical and statistical aspects, avoiding discussion on practicalities and operational issues.

From R1, Page 3:

"The Committee recognises that moving to ES could entail certain operational challenges; nonetheless it believes that these are outweighed by the benefits of replacing VaR with a measure that better captures tail risk."



#### Definition

 $VaR_{\alpha}(X)$ , for  $\alpha \in (0,1)$ ,

$$
VaR_{\alpha}(X) = F_X^{-1}(\alpha) = \inf\{x \in \mathbb{R} : F_X(x) \ge \alpha\}.
$$

#### Definition

$$
ES_{\alpha}(X), \text{ for } \alpha \in (0,1), \text{ if } \mathbb{E}[X] < \infty,
$$

$$
\mathrm{ES}_\alpha(X) = \frac{1}{1-\alpha} \int_\alpha^1 \mathrm{VaR}_\delta(X) d\delta \underset{(F \text{ cont.})}{=} \mathbb{E}\left[X | X > \mathrm{VaR}_\alpha(X)\right].
$$

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## VaR versus ES, extreme value theory

- For all  $\alpha \in (0, 1) \Rightarrow ES_{\alpha}(X) \geq VaR_{\alpha}(X)$ .
- For light tailed distributions (such as  $X \sim N(\mu, \sigma^2)$ ),

$$
\lim_{\alpha\to 1}\frac{\mathrm{ES}_\alpha(X)}{\mathrm{VaR}_\alpha(X)}=1.
$$

• For heavy tailed distributions: *P*(*X* > *x*) =  $x^{-1/\xi}L(x)$ , 0 <  $\xi$  < 1, *L* slowly varying,

$$
\lim_{\alpha \to 1} \frac{\text{ES}_{\alpha}(X)}{\text{VaR}_{\alpha}(X)} = \frac{1}{1 - \xi}.
$$

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VaR versus ES, 0.99 vs 0.975

From R4: Page 22, *Moving to expected shortfall*: "... using an ES model, the Committee believes that moving to a confidence level of 97.5% (relative to the 99th percentile confidence level for the current VaR measure) is appropriate."



Example: *X* ∼ Normal(0,1).

 $ES_0$  975 $(X) = 2.3378$ 

$$
VaR_{0.99}(X) = 2.3263.
$$

They are quite close for all normal models!

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# VaR versus ES, 0.99 vs 0.975

<span id="page-10-0"></span>From EVT: approximately,

- $\bullet$  for heavy-tailed risks,  $ES<sub>0.975</sub>$  yields a more conservative value than VaR<sub>0</sub>.99;
- $\bullet$  for light-tailed distributions,  $ES<sub>0.975</sub>$  yields an equivalent regulation principle as VaR<sub>0.99</sub>;

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• for risks that do not have a very heavy tail, it holds  $ES_0$  975 $(X) \approx \text{VaR}_0$  99 $(X)$ .

 $\rightarrow$  [details](#page-44-0)



Consider:

- One-period risk positions  $X_1, \ldots, X_d$  with known distribution functions (dfs)  $F_i$ ,  $i = 1, \ldots, d$ ;
- Portfolio position  $X_d^+ = X_1 + \cdots + X_d$ ;
- Va $R_{\alpha}(X_i)$ ,  $i = 1, \ldots, d$ , the marginal VaR's at the common confidence level  $\alpha \in (0,1)$ .

Task:

Calculate 
$$
VaR_{\alpha}(X_d^+)
$$

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Problem:

<span id="page-11-0"></span>We need a *joint* model for the random vector  $\mathbf{X} = (X_1, \ldots, X_d)'$ 



**X** elliptical

 $\delta$ bar  $\delta$ 

$$
VaR_{\alpha}(X_d^+) \leq \sum_{1=1}^d VaR_{\alpha}(X_i)
$$

Examples: multivariate Gaussian, multivariate Student t.

**X** comonotone i.e. there exist increasing functions  $\psi_i$ ,  $i = 1, \ldots, d$ and a random variable *Z* so that

$$
X_i = \psi_i(Z)
$$

then

$$
VaR_{\alpha}(X_d^+) = \sum_{i=1}^d VaR_{\alpha}(X_i)
$$

i.e.  $VaR_{\alpha}$  (like  $ES_{\alpha}$ ) is comonotone additive.

**•** Diversification benefit: one often uses

$$
(1-\delta)\sum_{i=1}^d \text{VaR}_{\alpha}(X_i),\ 0<\delta<1.
$$

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#### The Fréchet (unconstrained) problem

$$
\underline{\text{VaR}}_{\alpha}(X_d^+) = \inf_{F} \{ \text{VaR}_{\alpha}(X_1^F + \dots + X_d^F) : X_i \stackrel{d}{\sim} F_i, i = 1, \dots, d \}
$$
  

$$
\overline{\text{VaR}}_{\alpha}(X_d^+) = \sup_{F} \{ \text{VaR}_{\alpha}(X_1^F + \dots + X_d^F) : X_i \stackrel{d}{\sim} F_i, i = 1, \dots, d \}
$$

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Equivalently, for C*<sup>d</sup>* the space of all *d*-copulas

$$
\underline{\text{VaR}}_{\alpha}(X_d^+) = \inf_{C \in \mathcal{C}_d} \{ \text{VaR}_{\alpha}(X_1^C + \dots + X_d^C) : X_i \stackrel{d}{\sim} F_i, i = 1, \dots, d \}
$$

$$
\overline{\text{VaR}}_{\alpha}(X_d^+) = \sup_{C \in \mathcal{C}_d} \{ \text{VaR}_{\alpha}(X_1^C + \dots + X_d^C) : X_i \stackrel{d}{\sim} F_i, i = 1, \dots, d \}
$$

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Recall from Sklar's Theorem:  $F = C(F_1, \ldots, F_d)$ .



#### <span id="page-15-0"></span> $d = 2$

The sharp bounds  $\overline{\text{VaR}}_\alpha(X_2^+)$  $\binom{+}{2}$  and  $\underline{\text{VaR}}_{\alpha}(X_2^+)$ 2 ) are known for *any* type of marginal distributions  $F_1$ ,  $F_2$ . Analytic formulas are given in Makarov (1981) and Rüschendorf (1982).

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 $\blacktriangleright$  [details](#page-48-0)



#### <span id="page-16-0"></span>*d* ≥ 3, Homogeneous case

- $\overline{\text{VaR}}_\alpha(X^+_d)$ : A dual bound technique introduced in Embrechts and Puccetti (2006).
- Analytical results obtained for both  $\overline{\text{VaR}}_\alpha(X_d^+)$  $\binom{+}{d}$  and  $\text{VaR}_{\alpha}(X_d^+)$  $_d^{\text{+}}$ ) under a tail-monotone condition on *F* (mostly satisfied in practice) by Wang, Peng and Yang (2013), based on the concept of complete mixability.
- Sharpness of the dual bound of  $\overline{\text{VaR}}_\alpha(X_d^+)$ *d* ) under same conditions obtained by Puccetti and Rüschendorf (2013).

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detail



#### *d* ≥ 3, Heterogeneous case

- Rearrangement Algorithm of Embrechts, Puccetti, Rüschendorf (2013) yields a powerful computational tool for the calculation of  $\overline{\text{VaR}}_{\alpha}(X_d^+)$  $\frac{d}{d}$ ) and  $\underline{\text{VaR}}_{\alpha}(X_d^+)$  $_d^+$ ), and possibly  $d \ge 1000$ .
- Analytical approximation and connection with convex order are given by Bernard, Jiang and Wang (2014).



#### Worst-dependence scenarios:

<span id="page-18-0"></span>
$$
\overline{\text{VaR}}_{\alpha}(X_d^+) = \sup_{F} \{ \text{VaR}_{\alpha}(X_1^F + \dots + X_d^F) : X_i \stackrel{d}{\sim} F_i, 1 \le i \le d \}.
$$
  

$$
\overline{\text{ES}}_{\alpha}(X_d^+) = \sup_{F} \{ \text{ES}_{\alpha}(X_1^F + \dots + X_d^F) : X_i \stackrel{d}{\sim} F_i, 1 \le i \le d \}
$$

$$
= \sum_{i=1}^d \text{ES}_{\alpha}(X_i).
$$

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## Two important measures

Measure 1 Superadditivity ratio

$$
\overline{\triangle}_{\alpha,d}(X_d^+) = \frac{\overline{\text{VaR}}_{\alpha}(X_d^+)}{\sum_{i=1}^d \text{VaR}_{\alpha}(X_i)}.
$$

Measure 2 Ratio between worst-ES and worst-VaR

$$
\mathcal{B}_{\alpha,d}(X_d^+) = \frac{\overline{\mathrm{ES}}_{\alpha}(X_d^+)}{\overline{\mathrm{VaR}}_{\alpha}(X_d^+)} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^d \mathrm{ES}_{\alpha}(X_i)}{\overline{\mathrm{VaR}}_{\alpha}(X_d^+)}.
$$

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## Dependence Uncertainty

Superadditivity ratio: some examples

- Short tailed risks
	- LogNormal(2,1)-distributed risks  $\Rightarrow$   $\overline{\triangle}_{0.999,d}(X_d^+) \approx 1.4$ .

-<br>-<br>-<br>-<br>-<br>-<br>-<br>-<br>-<br>-<br>-<br><br>-<br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br>

- Gamma(3,1)-distributed risks  $\Rightarrow$   $\overline{\triangle}_{0.999,d}(X_d^+) \approx 1.1$ .
- Heavy tailed risks
	- Pareto(2)-distributed risks  $\Rightarrow$   $\overline{\triangle}_{0.999,d}(X_d^+) \approx$  2.

In QRM applications often Pareto( $\theta$ ) with  $\theta \in [0.5, 5]$ :

- [0.5, 1] catastrophe insurance,
- [3, 5] market return data,
- $\theta$  > 0.5 for operational risk.

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<span id="page-21-0"></span>Asymptotic equivalence for large dimensions of the risk portfolio, under some general conditions:

$$
\lim_{d \to \infty} \frac{\overline{\mathrm{ES}}_{\alpha}(X_d^+)}{\overline{\mathrm{VaR}}_{\alpha}(X_d^+)} = 1
$$

 $\rightarrow$  [details](#page-52-0)

 $\bullet$  In the case of  $F_i$  being identical:

$$
\overline{\triangle}_{\alpha,d}(X_d^+) \approx \frac{\text{ES}_{\alpha}(X_1)}{\text{VaR}_{\alpha}(X_1)}.
$$

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## Application: Operational Risk

#### Definition

Operational risk is the risk of losses resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems, or external events.

Remark: This definition includes legal risk but excludes reputational and strategic risk.



## **The LDA Operational risk capital calculation under Basel II**

The ingredients:

- Risk measure VaR*α*
- Holding period: 1 year
- Confidence level: 99.9%, *α* = 0*.*999
- The data  $7 \times 8$  matrix; 8 Business lines, 7 Loss types
- Often: aggregate column-wise  $\Rightarrow$  Va $R^{(1)}_{\alpha}, \ldots,$  Va $R^{(8)}_{\alpha}$

$$
\text{Aggregate:} \quad \textstyle{\sum_{i=1}^{8}} \text{VaR}_{\alpha}^{(i)} = \text{VaR}_{\alpha}^{+}.
$$



## Example: Pareto(2) risks

Sharp bounds on VaR and ES for the sum of *d* Pareto(2) distributed rvs for  $\alpha = 0.999$ ; VaR $^+_{\alpha}$  corresponds to the comonotonic case.



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An inhomogeneous Portfolio

Dependence-uncertainty spreads of VaR and ES for an inhomogeneous portfolio  $X_d^+ = X_1 + \cdots + X_d$ , where *X*<sup>*i*</sup> ∼ Pareto(2 + 0*.*1*i*)*, i* = 1*, . . .* , 5*; X*<sub>*i*</sub> ∼ Exp(*i* − 5)*, i* = 6*, . . .* , 10*;*  $X_i \sim \text{Log-Normal}(0, (0.1(i-10))^2), i = 11, \ldots, 20.$ 



Generally, VaR*α*(*X* + *d* ) has a larger DU-spread compared to  $ES_\beta(X_d^+$  $^+_d$ ) for  $\alpha \geq \beta$ ; see Embrechts, Wang and Wang (2014).



Recall from R1, Page 41, Question 8 "*. . . robust backtesting . . .*"

Backtesting:

- (i) estimate a risk measure from past observations;
- (ii) test whether (i) is appropriate using future observations;

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(iii) purpose: test and update risk measure forecasts.



## Example - VaR backtesting:

- (1) suppose the estimated/modeled VaR<sub>α</sub> is *V* at  $t = 0$ ;
- (2) consider  $A_t = I_{\{X_t > V\}}$  based new iid observations  $X_t$ ,  $t > 0$ ;
- (3) standard hypothesis testing methods for  $H_0$ :  $A_t$  are iid Bernoulli( $1 - \alpha$ ) random variables.

For ES such simple and intuitive backtesting techniques do not exist!



## Elicitability

- A new notion for comparing risk measure forecasts: elicitability; Gneiting (2011).
- Roughly speaking, a risk measure (statistical functional)  $\rho$  :  $\mathcal{P} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  is elicitable if  $\rho$  is the unique solution to the following equation:

$$
\rho(L) = \underset{x \in \mathbb{R}}{\text{argmin}} \mathbb{E}[s(x, L)],
$$

where

 $s : \mathbb{R}^2 \to [0, \infty)$  is a strictly consistent scoring function;

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for example, the mean is elicitable with  $s = (x - L)^2$ .



## Elicitability and backtesting

- **•** suppose the estimated/modeled  $\rho$  is  $\rho_0$  at  $t = 0$ ;
- based on new iid observations  $X_t$ ,  $t > 0$ , consider the statistics  $s(\rho_0, X_t)$ ; for instance, test statistic can typically be chosen as  $T_n(\rho_0) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{t=1}^n s(\rho_0, X_t)$ ;
- $\bullet$  *T<sub>n</sub>*( $\rho$ <sub>0</sub>): a statistic which indicates the goodness of forecasts.
- updating  $\rho$ : look at a minimizer for  $T_n(\rho)$ ;
- the above procedure is model-independent.

Elicitable statistics are straightforward to backtest.



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## VaR vs ES: elicitability

#### **Theorem** (Gneiting (2011)).

Under general conditions,

- VaR is elicitable:
- ES is not elicitable.



#### Remarks:

- under specific EVT-based conditions, backtesting of ES is possible; see McNeil et al. (2005), p.163;
- the relevance of elicitability for risk management purposes is heavily contested:
	- Emmer, Kratz and Tasche (2014): alternative method for backtesting ES; favors ES.
	- Davis (2014): backtesting based on prequential principle; favors quantile-based statistics (VaR-type).



#### Robustness - some quotes

A precise definition matters!

- Cont et al. (2010): "Our results illustrate in particular, that using recently proposed risk measures such as CVaR/Expected Shortfall leads to a less robust risk measurement procedure than Value-at-Risk."
- Kou et al. (2013): "Coherent risk measures are not robust", proposed Median Shortfall (VaR-like).
- Emmer et al. (2014): "The fact that VaR does not cover tail risks 'beyond' VaR is a more serious deficiency although ironically it makes VaR a risk measure that is more robust than the other risk measures we have considered."



## Example: different internal models

- Same data set, two different parametric models (e.g. normal vs student-t).
- Estimation of parameters, and compare the VaR and ES for two models.
- VaR is more robust in this setting, since it does not take the tail behavior into account (normal and student-t do not make a big difference).
- ES is less robust (heavy reliance on the model's tail behavior).
- <span id="page-33-0"></span>Capital requirements: heavily depends on the internal models.

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## Opposite opinions

- Cambou and Filipovic (2014): " ES is robust, and VaR is non-robust based on the notion of *φ*-divergence".
- Krätschmer et al. (2014): "We argue here that Hampel's classical notion of qualitative robustness is not suitable for risk measurement ..." (Introduce an index of qualitative robustness).
- BCBS (2013, R4): "This confidence level [97.5th ES] will provide a broadly similar level of risk capture as the existing 99th percentile VaR threshold, while providing a number of benefits, including generally more stable model output and often less sensitivity to extreme outlier observations."

Much more work is nee[ded](#page-33-0)[!](#page-35-0)



## VaR versus ES: Summary

## Value-at-Risk

- **1** Always exists
- **2 Only frequency**
- <sup>3</sup> Non-coherent risk measure (non-subadditive)
	- Heavy tailed
	- Very skew
	- Special dependencies
- <sup>4</sup> Backtesting straightforward
- **6** Estimation (EVT)
- **6** Model uncertainty
- <span id="page-35-0"></span>**•** Robust with respect to weak topology

## Expected Shortfall

- **1** Needs first moment
- <sup>2</sup> Frequency and severity
- **3** Coherent risk measure (diversification benefit)
- **4** Backtesting an issue (non-elicitability)
- **5** Estimation (EVT)
- **6** Model uncertainty
- **•** Robust with respect to Wasserstein distance



- <span id="page-36-1"></span>C1 Q8 and Basel 3.5: a short question with many ramifications. No clear answer so far.
- C2 On ES or VaR? ES! *. . .* however *. . .*
- C3 Concerning MU and VaR bounds:
	- Find sharp couplings
	- Are they realistic in practice?
	- Impose extra dependence assumptions

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• Add statistical uncertainty

C4 Many more examples needed

C5 Expectiles as an alternative?

<span id="page-36-0"></span>[more discussions on risk measures](#page-53-0)



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## THANK YOU!

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VaR versus ES, 0.99 vs 0.975

<span id="page-44-0"></span>• In general: for  $\xi \in [0,1)$  ( $\xi = 0$  indicates a light tail),

$$
\frac{\text{ES}_{0.975}(X)}{\text{VaR}_{0.975}(X)} \approx \frac{1}{1-\xi},
$$

and

$$
\frac{\text{VaR}_{0.99}(X)}{\text{VaR}_{0.975}(X)} \approx 2.5^{\xi}.
$$

<span id="page-44-1"></span>Putting the above together,

$$
\frac{\text{VaR}_{0.99}(X)}{\text{ES}_{0.975}(X)} \approx 2.5^{\xi} (1 - \xi).
$$

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## VaR versus ES, 0.99 vs 0.975

$$
\bullet\ \xi\in[0,1),
$$

$$
\frac{\text{VaR}_{0.99}(X)}{\text{ES}_{0.975}(X)} \approx 2.5^{\xi}(1-\xi) \leq e^{\xi}(1-\xi) \leq 1.
$$

#### Approximately,  $ES<sub>0.975</sub>$  yields a more conservative regulation principle than VaR<sub>0.99</sub>.

• For a particular *X*, it is not always  $ES_{0.975}(X) \geq VaR_{0.99}(X)$ .

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## VaR versus ES, 0.99 vs 0.975

• Light-tailed distributions: as  $\xi \to 0$ ,

$$
\frac{\text{VaR}_{0.99}(X)}{ES_{0.975}(X)} \approx 2.5^{\xi}(1-\xi) \to 1.
$$

For light-tailed distributions, ES<sub>0.975</sub> yields an (approximately) equivalent regulation principle as VaR<sub>0.99</sub>.

**•** It seems that the value

$$
c = 2.5 = (1 - 0.975)/(1 - 0.99)
$$

is chosen such that *c* is close to  $e \approx 2.72$ , so that the approximation  $c^{\xi}(1-\xi) \approx 1$  holds most accurate for small *ξ*; note that  $e^{-ξ} ≈ 1 - ξ$  for small *ξ*.

## VaR versus ES, 0.99 vs 0.975 (*α* = 1*/ξ*)





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## VaR Bounds

#### <span id="page-48-0"></span>Makarov and Rüschendorf

For *d* = 2, sharp tail bound for any *s*  $\in \mathbb{R}$  is:

$$
\sup\{P(X_1+X_2\geq s):X_i\sim F_i\}=\inf_{x\in\mathbb{R}}\{\overline{F}_1(x-)+\overline{F}_2(s-x)\},\
$$

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where 
$$
\overline{F}_i(x) = 1 - F_i(x) = P(X_1 > x)
$$
 and  $\overline{F}_1(x-) = P(X_1 \ge x)$ .

## VaR Bounds

#### <span id="page-49-0"></span>Sharp VaR bounds (Wang, Peng and Yang (2013))

Suppose that the density function of *F* is decreasing on  $[b, \infty)$ for some  $b \in \mathbb{R}$ . Then, for  $\alpha \in [F(b),1)$ , and  $X \stackrel{d}{\sim} F$ ,

$$
\overline{\text{VaR}}_{\alpha}(X_d^+) = d\mathbb{E}[X|X \in [F^{-1}(\alpha + (d-1)c_{d,\alpha}), F^{-1}(1 - c_{d,\alpha})]],
$$

 $c_{d,\alpha}$  is the smallest number in  $[0, \frac{1}{d}(1-\alpha)]$  s.t.

$$
\int_{a+(d-1)c}^{1-c} F^{-1}(t)dt \ge \frac{1-\alpha-dc}{d}(F^{-1}(\alpha+(d-1)c)+F^{-1}(1-c)).
$$

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Red part clearly has an ES-type form ( $c_{d,\alpha} = 0$  leads to ES).



#### Sharp VaR bounds II

Suppose that the density function of *F* is decreasing on its support. Then for  $\alpha \in (0,1)$  and  $X\stackrel{d}{\sim}F$ ,

$$
\underline{\text{VaR}}_{\alpha}(X_d^+) = \max\{(d-1)F^{-1}(\alpha) + F^{-1}(0), d\mathbb{E}[X|X \le F^{-1}(\alpha)]\}.
$$

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Red part has a Left-Tail-ES-type form.

## Complete Mixability

Definition (Complete mixability, Wang and Wang (2011))

A distribution function *F* on R is called *d*-completely mixable (*d*-CM) if there exist *d* random variables  $X_1, \ldots, X_d$  identically distributed as *F* such that

$$
P(X_1 + \cdots + X_d = dk) = 1,\tag{1}
$$

for some  $k \in \mathbb{R}$ .

- Some examples of CM distributions: Normal, Student t, Cauchy, Uniform, Binomial.
- Most relevant result: *F* has a monotone density on a finite interval with a mean condition (depends on *d*) is *d*-CM.
	- Examples: truncated Pareto, Gamma, Log-normal.

## Asymptotic Equivalence

#### <span id="page-52-0"></span>Theorem (Embrechts, Wang and Wang (2014))

Suppose the continuous distributions  $F_i$ ,  $i \in \mathbb{N}$  satisfy that for  $X_i \sim F_i$  and some  $\alpha \in (0,1)$ ,

(i)  $\mathbb{E}[|X_i - \mathbb{E}[X_i]|^k]$  is uniformly bounded for some  $k > 1$ ;

(ii) 
$$
\liminf_{d \to \infty} \frac{1}{d} \sum_{i=1}^d ES_{\alpha}(X_i) > 0.
$$

Then

$$
\lim_{d \to \infty} \frac{\overline{\mathrm{ES}}_{\alpha}(X_d^+)}{\overline{\mathrm{VaR}}_{\alpha}(X_d^+)} = 1.
$$

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## The Holy Triangle of Risk Measures

<span id="page-53-0"></span>There are many desired properties of a good risk measure. Some properties are without debate:

- cash-invariance:  $\rho(X + c) = \rho(X) + c, c \in \mathbb{R}$ ;
- monotonicity:  $\rho(X) \leq \rho(Y)$  if  $X \leq Y$ ;
- identity:  $\rho(1) = 1$ ;
- law-invariance:  $\rho(X) = \rho(Y)$  if  $X = dY$ .

(A standard risk measure; those properties are not restrictive)

## The Holy Triangle of Risk Measures

In my opinion, in addition to being standard, the three key elements of being a good risk measure are

- (C) Coherence (subadditivity):  $\rho(X + Y) \leq \rho(X) + \rho(Y)$ . [diversification benefit/capturing the tail/convex optimization/capital allocation]
- (A) Comonotone additivity:  $\rho(X + Y) = \rho(X) + \rho(Y)$  if *X* and *Y* are comonotone. [economical interpretation/distortion representation/non-diversification identity]
- (E) Elicitability [robust estimation/backtesting straightforward].

## The War of the Two Kingdoms

#### **• Some financial mathematicians**

- appreciate coherence (subadditivity);
- favor ES in general.
- Some financial statisticians
	- appreciate backtesting and statistical advantages;
	- favor VaR in general.

A natural question is to find a standard risk measure which is both coherent (subadditive) and elicitable.

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## Expectiles

For  $0 < \tau < 1$  and  $X \in L^2$ ,

$$
e_{\tau}(X) = \underset{x \in \mathbb{R}}{\text{argmin }} \mathbb{E}[\tau \max(X - x, 0)^2 + (1 - \tau) \max(x - X, 0)^2].
$$

 $e_{\tau}(X)$  is the unique solution  $x$  of the equation for  $X \in L^1$ :

$$
\tau \mathbb{E}[(X - x)^{+}] = (1 - \tau) \mathbb{E}[(x - X)^{+}].
$$

 $e_{1/2}(X) = \mathbb{E}[X].$ 



The risk measure  $e_{\tau}$  has the following properties:

- **1** homogeneous and standard,
- 2 subadditive for  $1/2 \leq \tau < 1$ , superadditive for  $0 < \tau \leq 1/2$ ,

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- **3** elicitable,
- $\bullet$  coherent for  $1/2 \leq \tau < 1$ ,
- <sup>5</sup> not comonotone additive in general.

Bellini et al. (2014), Ziegel (2014), Delbaen (2014).

## The War of the Three Kingdoms

In summary:

- VaR has  $(A)$  and  $(E)$ : often criticized for not being subadditive: diversification/aggregation problems and inability to capture the tail!
- ES has (C) and (A): criticized for estimation, backtesting and robustness problems!
- Expectile has (C) and (E): criticized for lack of economical meaning, distributional computation and over-diversification benefits!

## The War of the Three Kingdoms

The following holds (Bellini and Bignozzi (2014), Ziegel (2014)):

- if *ρ* is coherent, and elicitable with a convex scoring function, then  $\rho$  is an expectile;
- any spectral risk measure (coherent and comonotone additive) must not be elicitable, expect for the mean.

In summary:

The only standard risk measure that has  $(C)$ ,  $(A)$  and  $(E)$  is the mean, which is not a tail risk measure, and does not have a risk loading.

• Remark: the very old-school risk measure/pricing principle  $\rho(X) = (1 + \theta) \mathbb{E}[X], \theta > 0$  has (C-subadditivity), (A) and (E), although it is not standard.

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## The Holy Triangle of Risk Measures



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Extreme-aggregation Measure

- For any risk measure *ρ*, denote its worst-case value under dependence uncertainty as *ρ*(*X* +  $_{d}^{+}$ ).
- For *X* ∼ *F*, let

$$
\Gamma_{\rho}(X) = \limsup_{d \to \infty} \frac{1}{d} \overline{\rho}(X_d^+),
$$

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 $W$  where  $X_d^+ = X_1 + \cdots + X_d$  and  $X_i \sim F$ ,  $i = 1, \ldots, d$ .

- Γ*<sup>ρ</sup>* is called an extreme-scenario measure induced by *ρ*.
- Γ*<sup>ρ</sup>* represents the limiting worst-case value of *ρ* for a homogeneous portfolio.
- **•** Special case:  $\Gamma_{VaR_{\alpha}} = ES_{\alpha}$ .

## Extreme-aggregation Measure

#### Theorem (Wang, Bignozzi and Tsanakas (2014))

*For commonly used classes of risk measures ρ,* Γ*<sup>ρ</sup> is a coherent risk measure. Moreover, it is*

- (a) *the smallest subadditive risk measure that dominates ρ;*
- (b) *a spectral risk measure if ρ is a distortion risk measure;*
- (c) *an expectile if ρ is a shortfall risk measure;*
- (d) *the mean if ρ is a superadditive distortion risk measure.*

Extreme-aggregation Measure

## When a non-coherent risk measure is used for a portfolio, its extreme behavior under dependence uncertainty leads to coherence.

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