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Reform of the Fiji National Provident Fund

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
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Reform of the Fiji National Provident Fund

- The problem:
 - From 1975, retirees from age 55 could elect to convert part or all their balance into an annual pension of **25%** of their conversion sum
 - Reform in 1998 phased in reduction to conversion factor down to **15%** over period 1999 to 2008
 - Conversion at 55 of 25% created additional liability of **3** times the conversion amount; even 15% created additional liability of **1** times conversion amount
 - By 30 June 2011 FNPF was technically insolvent

Reform of the Fiji National Provident Fund

Operation of the Pension Buffer Reserve (PBR)




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- PBR levy
 - Original member contribution was 10% of wages (5% employee, 5% employer) starting 1966
 - With introduction of pension option in 1975, additional 2% levied (1% ee, 1% er) to support pensions
 - Represented a subsidy since most members did not elect a pension
 - Described by World Bank in 2007 as “a heavy cross-subsidisation from poorer and younger workers to older and richer ones”
 - Levy ceased 2000

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Operation of the PBR with take-up by number



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- Financial assets

30 June 2011	(m)
Government bonds	\$2,063
Quasi-gov't bonds	\$366
Term deposits	\$232
Loans & advances	\$393
Equities	\$64
Equity in subsidiaries	\$276
Property investments	\$86
Cash	\$182
Total	\$3,662

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- Solvency

30 June 2011	Before reform (m)
Total assets	\$3,768
Member accounts	\$2,997
Solvency reserve for above	\$300
Pension liability	\$565
Death benefit reserve	\$19
Total liabilities	\$3,881
(Deficit)/Surplus	(\$113)

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- The solution:
 - Total conversion amounts for current pensioners = **\$310 m** compared to liability of **\$565 m**
 - Hence pay back investment and invite and encourage to re-invest in sustainably priced pension
 - Analogy is with bond: coupon far in excess of what could be earned, hence repay without penalty
 - Analogy incomplete inasmuch as bond has value on death; however, at age 55, margin of 2-300 basis points as compensation more than adequate

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- Solvency revisited

30 June 2011	Before (m)	After (m)
Total assets	\$3,768	\$3,768
Member accounts	\$2,997	\$2,997
Solvency reserve for above	\$300	\$300
Pension liability	\$565	\$310
Pension solvency		\$31
Death benefit reserve	\$19	\$19
Total liabilities	\$3,881	\$3,657
(Deficit)/Surplus	(\$113)	\$111

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- Use of surplus:
 - Reductions resulting from applying sustainable age-based rates are of order of 40-50% at ages 55-65
 - Hence determined to use surplus to mitigate effect at bottom end and provide some encouragement to re-invest at top end
 - Several possibilities discussed and actuarially costed
 - Eventual design gave rise to “top up” pensions at three levels depending on new and old pension levels
 - Top up available only if total reconversion to pension

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Distribution of monthly pensions




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- Top up basis
 - For those for whom both the old and the new pension was under \$100 per month: a top up to the new pension such that the total is \$100 per month
 - For those for whom the old pension was between \$100 and \$300 per month: a top up to the new pension to take the total to the old pension total
 - For those for whom the old pension was over \$300 per month: the higher of
 - A. A top up to the new pension to \$300 per month
 - B. A top up pension purchased by 25% of the conversion amount capped at \$10,000

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Distribution of top up and effective reduction



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- Top up effects
 - Some 2,000 better off
 - Another 5,000 stay the same
 - The next 2,000 face reduction between 0-30%
 - Average value of top up not too different across deciles
- Implementation
 - Pension counselors held face to face meeting
 - Explain options
 - And validate ...

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- Take up
 - Preliminary indication of 70% take up of pension by number
 - For some others, opportunity to receive lump sum very welcome
 - Some have also chosen a new term annuity option

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- Objections raised
 - Some misunderstanding, also some misrepresentation
 - Some of the arguments put forward:
 - a. Current pensions are sustainable
 - b. The FNPF is breaking contracts
 - c. The FNPF legislation incorporated a Government guarantee
 - d. The Pension Buffer Reserve was misused
 - e. Pensioners are being forced to pay for bad investment decisions
 - f. Pensioners have budgeted for the future and now have to readjust without the capacity to replace earnings

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- Current pensions are sustainable?
 - Two aspects: (a) past rates were OK, (b) regardless of that, money available for future
 - Past rates, even at 15% conversion, justifiable only if high pensioner mortality
 - Exercise of outcome of PBR excluding levy is deficit of \$170 million
 - Allowing estimate of credit for own levy payments reduces this to deficit of \$100 million
 - For future, FNPF now insolvent without cross subsidy
 - Subsidy needed calculated as reducing member accumulations by 30% over working lifetime

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- The FNPF is breaking contracts?
 - Is a legal question, not actuarial
 - Entitlement is statutory
 - Purchase price is being returned and past reward has been more than fair
 - Option to segregate
 - Option to hypothecate
- However
 - Legal challenge opportunity removed by legislation
 - Motive was to eradicate implementation delay
 - But suggests independent review & report desirable

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- The FNPF legislation incorporated a Government guarantee ?
 - In fact is a liquidity guarantee, ie will make advance but has to be repaid
 - No other guarantee

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- The Pension Buffer Reserve was misused ?
 - Argue that should have been operated as a fund, with interest credited
 - But was never meant to be a fund, and doing so would have exacerbated transfer from contributors to pensioners
 - Interest credited to member accounts in the 90's was higher than return on investment, but recent pensioners obtained benefit too
 - Over last few years crediting rate has been below return on investment
 - Allowance for pensioner own levies does not alter deficit position

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- Pensioners are being forced to pay for bad investment decisions ?
 - Have been some mistakes
 - But these impact on contributors to much greater extent overall than on pensioners

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- Pensioners have budgeted for the future and now have to readjust without the capacity to replace earnings?
 - This has validity – although ..
 - Impact is at top end, where more capacity to adjust
 - Some in a position to continue in work and obtain additional pension
 - Nonetheless, is acknowledged that this was not a desirable outcome
 - But: choice was between continued subsidy of past members who elected pensions, and ensuring future contributors build up worthwhile retirement balances

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- CONCLUSION
- This presentation has focused only on change to current pension entitlements
- Reform has also made significant improvements in governance, transparency, and separation of business
- In respect of pension change, though, will finish with the following view expressed by a colleague in the process:

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“There are no losers; but there are a few who have stopped winning at others expense”